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We develop a model in which a worker’s skills determine the worker’s
current wage and sector. The market and the worker are initially un-
certain about some of the worker’s skills. Endogenous wage changes
andsectormobilityoccuraslabormarketparticipantslearnaboutthese
unobserved skills. We show how the model can be estimated using
nonlinear instrumental variables techniques. We apply our method-
ology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations
and industries using individual-levelpaneldatafromtheNationalLon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth. We ﬁnd that high-wage sectors employ
high-skill workers and offer high returns to workers’ skills.
I. Introduction
We analyze the theoretical and econometricimplicationsofcomparative
advantage and learning for the wages and sector afﬁliations of individuals
We are grateful to David Card and Robert Topel for helpful comments on an
earlier version of this article and to the National Science Foundation (Gibbons and
Katz) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada (Lemieux and682 Gibbons et al.
and for changes in these variables over workers’ careers. After developing
the theory and econometrics, we turn to two empirical applications of
our methodology concerning the wages and allocations of workers across
occupations and across industries.
Our focus on comparative advantage is motivated by a large and es-
tablished literature. Many have found that the average characteristics of
individuals vary by sector.
1 Furthermore, several have found that the mea-
sured returns to individuals’ observable characteristics vary by sector.
2
Finally, Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) rejected the hypothesis that the
returns to individuals’ time-invariant unmeasured characteristics are con-
stant across sectors.
Our focus on learning is motivated by a smaller and more recent lit-
erature. While Jovanovic (1979), Harrisand Holmstrom(1982),andothers
showed long ago that learning models could provide new interpretations
for important features of the data (such as the return to seniority and the
increase in the variance of wages with experience), recent work has built
on these foundations to derive and test novel implications, many of which
have survived confrontations with data.
3
Our theoretical model emphasizes the role of worker skills that cannot
be measured by an econometrician. To clarify the exposition of the econ-
ometrics, we develop the theory in stages. We begin with two models in
which workers’ skills are equally valued in all sectors. In the ﬁrst of these
models, all labor market participants have perfect information about
workers’ skills; in the second, information isinitiallyimperfect,butoutput
observations convey additional information over time and so endogenize
Parent) for ﬁnancial support. Contact Lawrence F. Katz, the corresponding author,
at lkatz@harvard.edu.
1 For example, Dickens and Katz (1987) found differences in average education
levels by industry, and Blackburn and Neumark (1992) found sorting by test scores
across industries.
2 For example, Mincer and Higuchi (1988) found differences in returns to tenure
and experience across industries in Japan and the United States, and Freeman and
Medoff (1984) found differences in returns to education and experience for union
and nonunion workers.
3 For example, Farber and Gibbons (1996) derive and test the prediction that the
residual from a regression of an individual’s score on an ability test (the Armed
Forces Qualifying Test [AFQT]) on observable characteristics and the ﬁrst wage
should have increasing explanatory power for subsequent wages as experience in-
creases. Continuing in this vein, Altonji and Pierret (2001) derive and test the
prediction that the effect of observable characteristics (like education) should de-
crease with experience, while the effect of initially unobservable characteristics like
AFQT (not only the AFQT residual) should increase with experience. Chiappori,
Salanie ´, and Valentin (1999) derive and test a new prediction from the Harris-
Holmstrom model, that comparing two individuals in the same job in period 1 and
the same (higher) job in period 3, future wage and promotion prospects are brighter
for the individual who was promoted later (i.e., in period 3 rather than period 2).Comparative Advantage 683
wage changes. We then develop two other models in which different
sectors place different values on workers’ skills and workers sort them-
selves into different sectors on the basis of comparative advantage. In the
ﬁrst of these latter two models, labor market participants again have per-
fect information about workers’ skills; in the second, information is again
imperfect, so learning endogenizes not only wage changes but now also
sector mobility.
Our richest model, with comparative advantage and learning, resembles
the learning and matching models of wages and turnover pioneered by
Jovanovic (1979), Ross, Taubman, and Wachter (1981), and MacDonald
(1982). In Jovanovic’s model, a worker’s performance is independent
across jobs, whereas in our model (like those of Ross et al. and Mac-
Donald), a worker’s performance in one job determines not only the
expected value of staying in that job but also the expected value of moving
to a given new job. We differ from Ross et al. and MacDonald by intro-
ducing a one-dimensional notion of ability that determines a worker’s
productivity in every sector, much as in Murphy (1986). The resulting
model of learning and sorting is a natural generalizationofthetwo-period,
two-sector, two-type model in Gibbons and Katz (1992).
As is well known, in our simplest theoretical model (in which worker
skills are equally valued in all sectors and there is no learning by labor-
market participants), the returns to time-varying worker characteristics
can be estimated using ﬁrst differences to eliminate individual ﬁxedeffects
that are unmeasured by the econometrician. Similarly, in this simplest
model, ﬁrst differences can be used to estimate sectoral wage differentials
without bias from unmeasured ﬁxed effects. Unfortunately, ﬁrst-differ-
ence estimation is not appropriate for any of the three other theoretical
models we develop. Simply put, in these models, a worker’s ﬁxed ability
does not translate into a ﬁxed effect in a wage equation, so ﬁrst-differ-
encing the wage equation does not correct ability bias. The contribution
of this article is to move beyond merely warning of this problem (e.g.,
as in Gibbons and Katz 1992) to proposing a solution.
Our theoretical models rely heavily on the assumption of normality.
Many models that rely on normality can be estimated by maximum like-
lihood or two-step methods, but estimating our dynamic model of wage
determination and sector afﬁliation would be computationally difﬁcult
because it entails more than two sectors and more than two periods. In
addition, it is not necessary to estimate the full model whentheparameters
of interest are those that determine the returns to skills and wage differ-
ences across sectors. We therefore undertake the more modest task of
estimating the wage equations in each sector.
4
4 Other results exist on the identiﬁability of related models in the absence of
normality. For example, Heckman and Honore ´ (1990) show that the Roy model is684 Gibbons et al.
We show that our richest theoretical model produces a random coef-
ﬁcients econometric model in a panel data setting, which can be estimated
using a nonlinear instrumental variables technique. Even in this richest
model, consistent estimates of the effects of both measured and unmea-
sured skills on wages require neither distributional assumptions nor stan-
dard exclusion restrictions. (That is, we use normal distributions to de-
velop the full theory, but we do not need these assumptions to estimate
the parameters of interest related to sectoral wage differentials and sector-
speciﬁc returns to skills.) Instead, the estimation strategy utilizes natural
restrictions available in panel data with three or more observations per
person. Our econometric approach is similar to other panel data models
in which ﬁrst-differenced estimates are inconsistent, such as Holtz-Eakin,
Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Lemieux (1998).
After developing the theory and econometrics, we undertake two em-
pirical investigations concerning sorting and wage differentials across oc-
cupations and industries using individual-level panel data from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Our richest theoretical model is
consistent with several familiar facts about wage determination: a typical
individual’s wage increases with experience, the variance of the wage dis-
tribution across individuals increases with experience, and the skewness
of the wage distribution increases with experience.
5 But variants of
Mincer’s (1974) theory can also explain these basic facts, so we focus on
our model’s further predictions concerning the returns to skills and the
resulting allocation of workers across sectors. For both occupations and
industries, we ﬁnd important variation in sector-speciﬁc returns to ob-
served and unobserved skills. Furthermore, in both cases, high-wage sec-
tors employ high-skill workers and offer high returns to workers’ skills,
so estimates of sectoral wage differences that do not account for sector-
speciﬁc returns to skill and the sorting of workers across sectors on the
basis of unmeasured skills are misleading and difﬁcult to interpret.
Although our empirical work explores two standard deﬁnitions of sec-
tors (i.e., occupations and industries), other deﬁnitions are possible. For
example, sectors could be jobs inside a ﬁrm (Lluis, in this issue; Gibbons
and Waldman 1999), states or regions within a country (Borjas, Bronars,
and Trejo 1992), or entire countries (Borjas 1987). In fact, the individuals
in our model need not be workers. Instead, with some changes to the
model, the workers could be reinterpreted as ﬁrms, where what we call
worker ability is reinterpreted as ﬁrm productivity, much as Jovanovic
(1982) reinterpreted Jovanovic (1979).
identiﬁed with panel data and exogenous shifts in the price of skills over time. But
Heckman and Honore ´ focus on the estimation of a sequence of static models; they
do not address learning and job mobility.
5 An illustrative discussion of these implications of the model and a comparison
with alternative labor market models is presented in Neal and Rosen (2000).Comparative Advantage 685
II. Theory and Econometrics
The four theoretical models analyzed below are special cases of the
following model. If worker i is employed in sector j at time t, the worker’s
output is
y p exp(X b   w ), (1) ijt it j ijt
where Xit is a vector of human capital and demographicvariablesmeasured
by the econometrician and represents determinants of productivity wijt
that are not measured by the econometrician. The worker characteristics
and the slope vector are known by all labor market participants at X b it j
the beginning of period t; the realized output is observed by all labor yijt
market participants at the end of period t. The error term has the wijt
components
w p Z   b (h     )   c , (2) ijt i j i ijt j
where denotes the portion of worker i’s productive ability that is Zi
equally valued in all sectors, denotes the portion that is differentially hi
valued across sectors, and is a random error. The coefﬁcients  ijt
are ﬁxed and known to all labor market participants. {b ,c ; j p 1, … ,J} jj
The noise terms are normal with zero mean and precision (i.e.,   h ijt  
variance ) and are independent of each other and of all the other
2 j p 1/h   
random variables in the model.
In developing thetheoryand econometrics,wetreat and differently. Z h ii
We assume throughout that is observed by all labor marketparticipants; Zi
this is the standard case of a ﬁxed effect that the econometrician cannot
observe but market participants can. For , however, we consider two hi
cases: perfect information (no learning by market participants, as with
) and imperfect information (learning). One could also imagine inves- Zi
tigating learning about . Farber and Gibbons (1996) study this problem Zi
in the absence of sector-speciﬁc returns to ability (i.e., and b p b b p jj
for every j, so that a worker’s unmeasured ability is and is b Z   bh ii
equally valued in every sector), but the combined problem of learning
about and about (with varying across sectors) awaits future Z h b i i j
research.
In the imperfect information case, all labor market participants share
symmetric but imperfect information about . In particular, given their hi
initial information ( and ), all participants in the labor market share ZX ii 1
the prior belief that is normal with mean m and precision h. Subsequent hi
productivity observations, , reﬁne this belief. Information in the labor yijt
market therefore remains symmetric and improves over time. For sim-
plicity, we assume that subsequent realizations of measured skills, Xit, are
conditionally independent of hi given Zi and . (This assumption is not Xi1686 Gibbons et al.
only convenient but realistic because the major time-varying element of
is experience.) Thus, market participants can compute Xit
lny   X b   Z   c ijt it j i j s p , (3) it bj
which yields , a noisy signal about the worker’s ability that s p h     it i ijt
is independent of the worker’s sector during period t. We call sit the
worker’s normalized productivity observation for period t. Let
t s p i
denote the history of the worker’s normalized productivity (s ,…,s ) i1 it
observations through period t. Then (from chap. 9 of DeGroot 1970) the
posterior distribution of hi given history is normal with mean
t si
hm   h (s   …   s )   i1 it t m(s ) p (4) ti h   th 
and precision . h p h   th t  
To close the model, we assume that workers are risk neutral and that
there is no cost to ﬁrms or workers at the beginning or end of a job (i.e.,
no hiring, ﬁring, or mobility costs), so we can restrict attention to single-
period compensation contracts. For simplicity, we further restrict atten-
tion to contracts that specify the period’s wage before the period’s pro-
duction occurs (as opposed to piece-rate contracts). Competition among
ﬁrms causes each ﬁrm in a given sector to offer a given worker a wage
equal to the expected value of the worker’s output in that sector, given
the worker’s observed characteristics and history of previous output
realizations.
It is not controversial that workers’ productive abilities are imprecisely
measured in standard micro data sets. But if unmeasured skills are to
explain estimated sector wage differentials, then these skills must be non-
randomly allocated across sectors. This, too, is plausible, for example
because different sectors use different technologies that require workers’
skills in different proportions. But if this unmeasured skill explanation
for measured sectoral wage differentials is correct, it suggests that the few
skills that are measured in standard micro data sets (hereafter “measured
skills”) should be systematically related to the sector in which the worker
is employed. We investigate this prediction about measured skills in our
empirical work on occupations and industries in Sections III and IV. In
this section’s discussion of econometric issues, however, we conﬁne our
attention to estimating the role of unmeasured skills.
A. Sorting without Comparative Advantage
In this subsection, we ignore the possibility of comparative advantage
by assuming that for every j, so that a worker’s unmeasured ability b p b j
is and is equally valued in every sector. Continuing in this vein, Z   bh iiComparative Advantage 687
we also assume in this section that for every j. But we allow the b p b j
interceptscjtovary by sector,inkeepingwiththepossibilitythatmeasured
sector premia may reﬂect true sector effects. Of course, all else constant,
jobs in sectors with high values of cj may be more attractive (depending
on the source of cj, such as rent sharing vs. compensating differentials).
If some sectors are more attractive, issues such as queuing and rationing
arise. Because our main interest is in the richer model with comparative
advantage in Section II.C, we donotformallyaddressqueuingorrationing
here.
In the perfect information case without comparativeadvantage,allﬁrms
know that the worker’s ability is . As always, the wage offered Z   bh ii
to worker i by ﬁrms in sector j in period t is the worker’s expected output
in that sector, but the only uncertainty in this case is the error term
in (2). Recall that if log v is normally distributed with mean m and b ijt
variance j
2, then . Therefore, the log wageoffered
2 E(v) p exp{m   (1/2)j }
to worker i in sector j in period t is
22 lnw p X b   Z   bh   c   (1/2)b j . (5) ijt it i i j  
Turning to the imperfect information case without comparative advantage,
in each period, ﬁrms in sector j bid worker i’s wage up to the worker’s
expected output in that sector (conditional on the publicly observable in-
formation available at that date), so the log wage is
22 lnw p X b   Z   bm   c   (1/2)b j , (6) ijt it i i,t 1 jt
where is shorthand for and
t 12 mm (s ) j p (h   th )/{h [h   (t   i,t 1 t 1 it   
. Note that converges to , the corresponding variance
22 1)h ]} jj ( p 1/h )   t   
term in equation (5), as the number of periods t goes to inﬁnity. Also, in
both the perfect and the imperfect information cases, the worker’s ability
hi is unmeasured by the econometrician (as is Zi); in the latter case, hi is
also unobserved by labor market participants (unlike Zi). Note that, since
t represents the number of years of experience in the model, the error
component will be captured by a function in labor market ex-
22 (1/2)b jt
perience that we include in all estimated models.
B. Estimation without Comparative Advantage
In the absence of both learning and comparative advantage, the source
of possible bias in conventional cross-section estimates of sectoral log
wage differentials is the potential partial correlation between sector af-
ﬁliation and unmeasured skills (Zi and hi) conditional on measured skills
(Xit). In this simplest case, the worker’s ﬁxed ability creates a (Z   bh ) ii
worker ﬁxed effect in the wage regression, which can be eliminated in
standard fashion. For example, a ﬁrst-differenced regression eliminates
the ﬁxed effect in (5). Z   bh ii688 Gibbons et al.
Even without comparative advantage, however, learning implies that
ﬁxed ability is not a ﬁxed effect in the earnings equation. Thekeyproperty
of our learning model is that Bayesian beliefs are a martingale. That is,
the conditional expectation in (4) obeys the law of motion
t m(s ) ti
m p m   y , (7) it i,t 1 it
where yit is a noise term orthogonal to . In somewhat more intuitive mi,t 1
terms, the market begins period t with the information contained in
and then extracts new information about hi from the output obser-
t 1 si
vation yijt (or, equivalently, sit). But the new information that can be ex-
tracted from yijt is precisely the part that could not be forecasted from
. Hence, the innovation yit is orthogonal to the prior belief .
t 1 sm i i,t 1
Farber and Gibbons (1996) explored some of the implications of this
martingale property. But they focused on several speciﬁc predictions that
can be derived regarding regressions in which the dependent variable is
the level of earnings, not the log of earnings. In this article, in contrast,
we use the log of earnings as the dependent variable, so thespeciﬁcFarber-
Gibbons predictions do not hold, but the martingale property of the
market’s beliefs continues to create endogeneity problems, as follows.
6
Formally, a ﬁrst-differenced regression eliminates Zi but not from mi,t 1
(6). Instead, ﬁrst-differencing (6) for a worker who switches from sector
j to sector j
  yields
lnw  lnw p (X   X )b   b(m   m ) it i,t 1 it i,t 1 i,t 1 i,t 2
2 2 2   (c   c )   (1/2)b (j   j ), (8) j  j t t 1
where . But may be correlated with the change m   m p yy i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t 1 i,t 1
in sector afﬁliation through whatever (unmodeled) process led unmea-
sured ability to be correlated with sector afﬁliation in the ﬁrst place.
7
Thus, with learning, ﬁrst-differenced estimates of sectoral wage differ-
6 Relative to Farber and Gibbons, we also use the more speciﬁc production func-
tion (1), the more speciﬁc error structure (2), and the more speciﬁc distributional
assumptions given in the text below (2). We impose these more speciﬁc assumptions
in order to explore several issues related to the returns to skills across sectors that
Farber and Gibbons could not address with their more general model.
7 For example, suppose that there are only two levels of ability, high and low,
but that sectors differ in the proportion of high-ability workers they employ. Con-
siderahigh-abilityworkerwhoseemploymentexogenouslyendsinsectorj.Suppose
that such a worker is equally likely to be reemployed in any of the economy’s jobs
for high-ability workers. Then there is some probability that the worker’s new job
is again in sector j, but if the worker changes sectors, then it is likely that the new
job is in a sector with a large number of high-ability jobs. In this case, positive
information about a worker’s ability will tend to be associated with shifts to high-
wage sectors (where high-skill jobs are more plentiful), and the reverse for negative
information.Comparative Advantage 689
entials are biased if the change in the residual is correlated with the change
in sector afﬁliation. Fortunately, this endogeneity problem is simple to
correct because the new information summarized in is not related yi,t 1
to wage, skill, or sector information in period or earlier. (See Sec. t   1
II.D for more discussion of this issue.) For example, equation (8) can be
estimated by two-stage least squares using the interaction of the worker’s
(publicly observable) score on an ability test (taken before the worker
entered the labor market) and the worker’s sector afﬁliation at as a t   1
valid instrumental variable for changes (between and t) in sector t   1
afﬁliation.
C. Sorting with Comparative Advantage
In this section, we relax the assumption that a worker’s ability isequally
valued in every sector. By introducing comparative advantage, we en-
dogenize sector afﬁliation. By subsequently introducing learning, we en-
dogenize not only wage changes but also sector mobility.
To analyze comparative advantage, we now return to the production
function speciﬁed in (1) and (2), where the slope coefﬁcients bj in (1) and
bj in (2) vary by sector. We index the J sectors so that bj strictly increases
in j: sector values the worker’s ability hi more than does sector j. j   1
In keeping with the notion that ability is productive, we assume that
. Given a ﬁxed Xit, there exist critical values of hi that determine b 1 0 1
the efﬁcient assignment of workers to sectors. Denoting these critical
values by the efﬁcient assignment rule assigns {v (X );j p 0,1, … ,J}, j it
worker hi to sector j if and only if where v (X ) ! h ! v (X ), j 1 it i j it
and strictly increases in j. See ﬁgure 1 v (X ) p   , v (X ) p  , v (X ) 0 it n it j it
for a graphical representation of this efﬁcient assignment rule.
We again analyze ﬁrst perfect and then imperfect information. In the
perfect information case, ﬁrms in sector j bid worker i’s wage up to the
expected output in that sector:
22 lnw p X b   Z   bh   c   (1/2)b j , (9) ijt it j i j i j j  
analogous to (5) but with the sector-speciﬁc returns bj and bj.
8 If the
worker faces no mobility constraints, worker i will choose to work in
sector j if . Thus, taking the model literally, sector v (X ) ! h ! v (X ) j 1 it i j it
mobility in the perfect information case is driven entirely by changes in
. One could envision exogenous shocks to sector demand that pro- X b it j
8 In this model, the sector-speciﬁc intercepts are now cj plus the term .
22 (1/2)b j j  
This additional term accounts for the fact that when wages are paid in advance,
differences in the variance of productivity across sectors (due to differences in the
returns to skill bj) lead to systematic differences in mean log wages because of the
log normal transformation mentioned earlier. We view this as just one amongseveral
other possible sources of systematic wages differences across sectors. Otherpossible
factors include compensating differentials, efﬁciency wages, and rents.690 Gibbons et al.
Fig. 1.—Efﬁcient assignment with comparative advantage
duce additional sector mobility in this model, but we will not formally
model such shocks for the same reason that we did not model queues or
rationing in Section II.A: our ultimate interest is in the model with com-
parative advantage and learning, which givesacoherentaccountofsectoral
mobility without reference to queues, rationing, or sectoralshocks.What-
ever the reason that worker i is employed in sector j in period t, in the
perfect information case with comparative advantage, we assume that the
worker’s wage is given by (9).
In the imperfect information case, we again assume that information
in the labor market is symmetric but imperfect, as described above. As
in the model of learning without comparative advantage, all participants
in the labor market share the prior belief that hi is normal with mean m
and precision h, conditional on their initial information Zi and Xi1. In-
ferences from the productivity observations, yijt, are greatly simpliﬁed
because the information content of an output observation is constant
across sectors; that is, (2) involves rather than This b (h     ) bh     . j i ijt j i ijt
functional form is what allows us to deﬁne the normalized productivity
observation for worker i in period t, sit from (3), to be a noisy signalComparative Advantage 691
about the worker’s ability that is independent of the worker’s sector
during period t. Relaxing this assumption about the functional form of
(2) would complicate the analysis because workers’ sector choices would
then depend on the beneﬁt from faster learning, as well as on the beneﬁt
from increased expected output given current beliefs. Relaxing the as-
sumption that all labor market participants observe Zi (so that there could
be learning aboutbothZiandhi)wouldcausesimilarcomplications.Under
our assumptions, the posterior distribution of hi given the history is
t si
normal with mean mit given by (4) and precision , regardless h p h   th t  
of the worker’s history of sector afﬁliations.
In this fourth model, with learning and comparative advantage, we
ﬁnally have an internally consistent account for sector afﬁliation, wages,
sector mobility, and wage changes, as follows. In each period, ﬁrms in
sector j bid a worker’s wage up to the worker’s expected output in that
sector, conditional on the publicly observable information about the
worker available at that date:
22 lnw p X b   Z   bm   c   (1/2)b j , (10) ijt it j i j i,t 1 j j t
which is analogous to (6) but with sector-speciﬁc returns bj and bj. The
model also includes sector-speciﬁc (experience) effects since the posterior
variance , which declines with time (labor market experience), is inter-
2 jt
acted with . The worker chooses to work in the sector offering the
2 bj
highest current wage. Thus, worker i chooses sector j in period if t   1
. In all of our models, including this richest v (X ) ! m ! v (X ) j 1 i,t 1 it j i,t 1
one, if the parameters and the measured charac- {b ,b ,c ; j p 1, … ,J} j j j
teristics Xit take on certain values, then one or more sectors may lie below
the upper envelope in ﬁgure 1 for all values of the unmeasured charac-
teristics, in which case no workers with such measured characteristics
should be employed in such sectors.
D. Estimation with Comparative Advantage
We now develop a nonlinear instrumental variables procedure to es-
timate the parameters in (9) and (10). This proce- {b ,b ,c ;j p 1, … ,J} j j j
dure does not rely on normality and can be implemented using standard
computer packages. To discuss the estimation of the model, deﬁne the
sector indicators Dijt, where equals one if person i is employed in Dijt
sector j at time t and zero otherwise.
The wage equation (10) for each sector j can then be written as a single
equation where measurement error mit is assumed to be independent of
sector afﬁliation:
lnw p Dc  DXb   Z    it ijt j ijt it j i
jj
22   D b m   (1/2) Db j   m . (11)    ijt j i,t 1 ijt j t it
jj692 Gibbons et al.
Estimates of the sector slopes and intercepts ob- {b ,c ; j p 1, … ,J} jj
tained by estimating equation (11) with ordinary least squares (OLS) are
inconsistent. The problem is that expected ability inﬂuences sector afﬁl-
iation, so is correlated with the set of sector dummies m {D , j p i,t 1 ijt
. If the worker’s ability were ﬁxed, known, and equally valued 1, … ,J}
in all sectors (as was the case with in Sec. II.B), then a ﬁrst- Z   bh ii
differenced regression would eliminate this ability bias. But the endo-
geneity problem in equation (11) is different from the usual ﬁxed-effect
case for two reasons. First, as noted in Section II.B, is a martingale mi,t 1
rather than a ﬁxed effect. This martingale property does not depend on
the normality assumptions in our theoretical model; all Bayesian beliefs
are martingales. In the absence of comparative advantage, we could handle
this martingale problem as described in Section II.B. But, second, com-
parative advantage causes to be interacted with the set of sector mi,t 1
dummies in (11). {D , j p 1, … ,J} ijt
Other panel data models in which ﬁrst-differenced estimates are in-
consistent have been considered in the literature. For example, Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1988) discuss the estimation of models in which the ﬁxed
effect is interacted with year dummies. They show that consistent esti-
mates can be obtained by quasi-differencing the equation of interest and
then using appropriate instrumental variables techniques. Similarly, Lem-
ieux (1998) estimates a model in which the return to a time-invariant
unobserved characteristic is different in the union and the nonunion
sectors.
The estimation strategy we follow also reliesonquasi-differencingcom-
bined with instrumental variables (IV) techniques. But the general case
of our estimation strategy—equation (13) below—is hard to interpret, so
we ﬁrst provide intuition via the following two-sector example. To sim-
plify the exposition, we suppress the independent variables Xit, the ﬁxed
effect Zi, and the measurement error mit. We also assume that all workers
are in sector 1 in period . Finally, we set and , so the t   1 c p 0 b p 1 11
wage equation for period is extremely simple: t   1
2 lnw p m   (1/2)j . i,t 1 i,t 2 t 1
The wage paid to worker i employed in sector k in period t is then
22 lnw p c   bm   (1/2)b j , it k k i,t 1 kt
where or 2, depending on whether the worker changes sectors. k p 1
Multiplying the former equation by bk, subtracting it from the latter
equation, and recalling from (7) that then yields m p m   y i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t 1
2 2 2 [] lnw   b lnw p c   b y   (1/2)j  (1/2)b j . it k i,t 1 k k i,t 1 t 1 kt
Thus, for workers who remain in sector 1, we have a ﬁrst-differencedComparative Advantage 693
wage equation , but for workers who move to sector 2, we have (b p 1) 1
a quasi-differenced wage equation . (b ( 1) 2
To estimate this equation, let represent employment in sector 2 in Dit
period t. We can then write
lnw  lnw p cD  (b   1)D lnw it i,t 12 it 2 it i,t 1
  y [1   (b   1)D ] i,t 12it
22 []   (1/2) (b   1)D   1j 2 it t
2 []   (1/2) (b   1)D   1j . 2 it t 1
This now looks more like a standard equation in ﬁrst differences, but
running a simple regression of the ﬁrst difference in wages on and Dit
will not yield consistent estimates of the coefﬁcients c2 and b2. D lnw it i,t 1
Although the error component is not correlated with y lnw y i,t 1 i,t 1, i,t 1
is still positively correlated with the sector afﬁliation dummy because Dit
workers who get a positive innovation are more likely to switch to sector
2 (in the case where or negativelycorrelatedif ).Furthermore, b 1 1, b ! 1 22
the composite error term is mechanically correlated y [1   (b   1)D ] i,t 12it
with . These problems can be resolved by rearranging terms D lnw it i,t 1
and estimating the quasi-differenced equation
lnwit  lnw p (c /b )D   y i,t 1 2 2 it i,t 1 1   (b   1)D 2 it
2 2 2   (1/2) j   (b   1)D j   j [] t 2 it t t 1
by nonlinear instrumental variables using appropriate instruments for
. This equation represents a simpliﬁed special case of our quasi-dif- Dit
ferenced estimating equation (13) below. As discussed earlier, the inno-
vation term is uncorrelated with variables from period and y t   1 i,t 1
earlier. Any variables from period and earlier (including sector af- t   1
ﬁliation histories) can thus be used as instruments. We also address the
issue of the sector-varying term in this estimating equation by in-
2 D j it t
cluding interactions of sector dummies and experience; these interaction
terms are treated as endogenous and instrumented for using interactions
of lagged sector afﬁliation dummies and experience.
In our general model, we proceed analogously. First, solving (11) for
yields mi,t 1
22 lnw   Dc  DXb   Z   (1/2) Db j   m it ijt j ijt it j i ijt j t it
j j j
m p . (12) i,t 1  Db ijt j
j
The lagged version of equation (12) yields a similar expression for694 Gibbons et al.
. Substituting the expressions for both and into the law m m m i,t 2 i,t 1 i,t 2
of motion yields:
9 m p m   y i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t 1
lnw lnw it i,t 1 p   Db   Db ijt j ij,t 1 j jj
22   Dc   DXb   (1/2)  Db j ijt j ijt it j ijt j t j j j
    Db ijt j j
22   Dc    DXb   (1/2)  Db j ij,t 1 j ij,t 1 i,t 1 j ij,t 1 jt  1 j j j
   e , it   Db ij,t 1 j j
(13)
where
Z   m Z   m i it i i,t 1
e p y    . it i,t 1   Db   Db ijt j ij,t 1 j jj
The estimating equations include interactions of sector dummies with
experience andof lagged sectordummieswithlaggedexperiencetocapture
the sector-varying, experience-varying terms involving and
2 D j ijt t
, respectively. The sector dummies are correlated with
2 D j D y ij,t 1 t 1 ijt i,t 1
in equation (13) because expected ability inﬂuences sector afﬁliation. To
handle this problem, we need instrumental variables for the set of sector
dummies (and for and for the interactions of {D ,j p 1, … ,J} lnw ijt i,t 1
sector dummies and experience capturing ). Such instrumental var-
2 D j ijt t
iables must, of course, be orthogonal to the error term in equation eit
(13). In particular, they must be orthogonal to the innovation term
. yi,t 1
The most obvious candidate instrumental variables are skill or sector
information from period or earlier. The second lag of the wage t   1
( ) is also a potential instrumentalvariable,asareinteractionsamong lnwi,t 2
these various variables. Since the evolution of wages and sector afﬁliation
over time is driven by the evolution of , these wage, skill, and sector mit
histories should help predict and thus and m lnw {D , j p i,t 1 i,t 1 ijt
. We chose the interaction between sector afﬁliation at time 1, … ,J} t  
and , and , as our main 1 t   2{ D , j p 1, … ,J}{ D ,j p 1, … ,J} ij,t 1 ij,t 2
instrumental variables. These interactions between sector afﬁliation at
9 In an earlier version of this article (Gibbons et al. 2002), we used a slightly
different quasi-differences procedure that amounts to multiplying both sides of eq.
(13) by Unfortunately, this alternative procedure yields inconsistent esti-   Db . ijt j
mates in the presence of learning (but consistent estimateswhenthereiscomparative
advantage but no learning). We are very grateful to Robert Topel and Derek Neal
for pointing out this problem.Comparative Advantage 695
and are uncorrelated with the error term in equation (13) t   1 t   2 eit
given the model’s assumption that sector afﬁliation is determined only
by perceptions about the sector-sensitive components of ability ( and Xit
) and is independent of any part of ability that is not differentiallyvalued hi
across sectors ( ). In appendix B we discuss in more detail why the model Zi
suggests using these variables as instruments. We also show evidence of
their predictive power. For efﬁciency reasons discussed below, we also
include a set of interactions of sector afﬁliation at time with the t   2
explanatory variables (as summarized by a skill index and years of Xit
experience) in the instrument set.
10
Equation (13) is not a standard wage equation since some of the pa-
rameters are on both sides of the equation. We therefore estimate the
parameters in equation (13) using nonlinearinstrumentalvariables(NLIV)
techniques. Consider e, a vector in which all the individual error terms
are stacked, and V, a matrix in which the individual instrument vector eit
(e.g., sector histories) are stacked. Since the error terms e should be vit
uncorrelated with the instruments V, the orthogonality condition
should hold. The NLIV method consists of setting the
  (1/N)eVp 0
sample analogs of as close as possible to zero by ﬁnding the
  (1/N)eV
values of the parameters cj, bj, and bj (for ) that minimize the j p 1, … ,J
quadratic form
      S p (1/N)(eV)M(eV) , (14)
where M is a weighting matrix. Note that the parameters {b ,b ,c ; j p j j j
are implicitly included in S because the elements of e are 1, … ,J} eit
computed as the difference between and the explanatory factors on lnwit
the right-hand side of equation (13). Under the assumption that is eit
homoskedastic and uncorrelated, it is well known that the most efﬁcient
estimate is obtained byusing theinverseofthevarianceofe
 Vasaweighting
matrix, .
11 Furthermore, it is easily shown (Hansen 1982) that
   1 M p (VV)
10 Since both the terms and require interactions with sector afﬁl-
22 X b (1/2)b j it j j t
iation, which is endogenous, it is natural to include some instruments for sector
afﬁliation interacted with those terms in the instrument set. In the estimation we
replace by a skill index discussed below and use experience to proxy for jt
2. X b it j
This leads to adding interactions between the second lag of sector afﬁliation (the
instruments for sector afﬁliation) and the skill index and experience to the main set
of instruments (interactions between sector afﬁliation at and ). t 1 t 2
11 Equation (13) shows that eit is a relatively complex function of the sector dum-
mies. So eit may be heteroskedastic even if the “structural” error terms , and y ,Z it i
are homoskedastic. We could allow for heteroskedasticity by using an efﬁcient mit
generalized method of moments (GMM) two-step procedure in which the param-
eters are ﬁrst estimated using . These consistent but inefﬁcient param-
   1 M p (VV )
eters can then be used to compute a heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrixS of
e
 V. Efﬁcient GMM estimates are then obtained using . Empirically, how-
 1 M p S
ever, we had more convergence problems with the efﬁcient GMM than with the696 Gibbons et al.
N times the minimized value of S follows a x
2 distribution with q degrees
of freedom, where q is the number of overidentiﬁying restrictions (the
difference between the number of instruments and the number of
parameters).
12
In the linear case where is homoskedastic and uncorrelated, NLIV eit
is just the well-known two-stage least squares estimator. One difﬁculty
with NLIV is that since we project a nonlinear function of the model
variables and of the parameters (e) into a linear set of instruments (V),
the instruments must be chosen in a way that predicts sufﬁciently well
the explanatory right-hand side of equation (13).
13 In additiontothesector
histories discussed above, we thus include as instruments a set of inter-
actions between the explanatory variables (as summarized by a skill Xit
index and years of experience) and the period dummies for sector t   2
afﬁliation . {D ,j p 1, … ,J} ij,t 2
In the perfect information case (but still with sorting), where unmea-
sured ability hi is observed by labor market participants, the quasi-dif-
ferenced equation (13) remains the same except that the innovation term
drops from the error term . The remaining endogeneity problem y e i,t 1 it
is due to the correlation between and the error component mi,t 1. lnwi,t 1
In this case, we simply use the full set of interactions between the sector
dummies at time t and as instruments for .
14 t   1 lnwi,t 1
III. Data
The data set used in this article is the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY). Individuals in the NLSY were between the ages of 14
inefﬁcient, but consistent, estimates based on the weighting matrix .
   1 M p (VV )
This mirrors the ﬁndings of Altonji and Segal (1996), who found serious small-
sample problems with theoptimallyweightedGMM(oroptimalminimumdistance)
estimator.
12 In complicated nonlinear models like ours, however, this overidentiﬁcationtest
is better thought of as an omnibus speciﬁcation test than as a standard test of the
validity of instruments commonly performed for linear models. These tests should
be interpreted with care. We discuss this issue in detail in an earlier version of the
article (Gibbons et al. 2002).
13 See Newey (1990) for more discussion and proposed (nonparametric)solutions
to this problem. Note that choosing the functional form or the number of instru-
ments can also be problematic in the linear model (Donald and Newey 2001).
14 In the absence of learning, either the interactions between sector afﬁliation at
time t and or at time and can be used as instruments. In practice, t 1 t 1 t 2
this choice has little impact on the results since both sets of instruments predict
very well the wage (see app. B). Since sector afﬁliation is exogenous in this model,
we do not need to include the additional interaction terms between the skill index,
experience, and sector afﬁliation at time discussed above. Note that Lemieux t 2
(1998) uses an identical strategy to estimate union wage differentials when unmea-
sured ability is known to all labor market participants but is differently rewarded
in the union and nonunion sectors: the interaction between the union status at time
t and is used as an instrument for the lagged wage. t 1Comparative Advantage 697
and 21 on January 1, 1979. We use up to 17 yearly observationsperworker
(from 1979 to 1996).
15 One advantage of the NLSY is that it allows us
to follow workers from the time they make their ﬁrst long-termtransition
to the labor force.
We use the same sample selection criteria as those used by Farber and
Gibbons (1996). We classify individuals as having made a long-term tran-
sition to the labor force when they spend at least 3 consecutive years pri-
marily working, following a year spent primarily not working. Someone
is classiﬁed as primarily working if she or he has worked at least half the
weeks since the last interview and averaged at least 30 hours per week
during the working weeks. Note that the “last interview” does not nec-
essarily refer to the previous calendar year if an individual had not been
interviewedtheyearbefore.Self-employedworkersaredeleted,asaremem-
bers of the NLSY military subsample. Readers are referred to appendix 1
in Farber and Gibbons (1996) for more details on the criteria used to
construct our NLSY sample.
Farber and Gibbons used NLSY data from 1979 to 1991 interview
years, whereas our data are through 1996. Except for the longer sampling
frame, the only noteworthy difference between our sample and Farber
and Gibbons’s has to do with union coverage in 1994. For some reason,
the question on union coverage in the current or most recent job at
interview time (job number 1 in the work history ﬁle) was not asked in
that year. Although the error was caught and ﬁxed during the ﬁeld period,
many respondents were simply not asked this question even though they
should have been. Consequently, the raw data shows a large number of
“valid skips.”
16 We provide a correction of our own to partially ﬁx this
problem and recover quite a few of those missing observations. More
precisely, if an individual in 1994 is working for the same employer as
the one he worked for in the previous interview, we assign the value of
the union coverage dummy for the previous interview year to the current
one. If the individual interviewed in 1994 has started working for a new
employer since the last interview, we check to see whether she or he is
still working for that employer in 1996. If so, we assign the value of the
union coverage dummy for that year to the 1994 interview.
From this NLSY sample, we focus on the subsample of observations
at which the individual was working at the interview date for at least the
previous 3 years. This sample restriction enables us to use the ﬁrst and
second lags of various variables in the estimation, as explained in Section
II.D. We exclude workers in agricultural jobs. Since we (later) divide
manufacturing into durable and nondurable goods manufacturing,wealso
15 There was no interview in 1995.
16 Personal communication from Steve McClaskie of the Center for Human Re-
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exclude a few workers who hold jobs in manufacturing industries that
are hard to classify as producing durable as opposed to nondurable
goods.
17 We are left with a sample of 35,438 observations on 5,904 workers
that satisfy these sample selection criteria.
To summarize the relationship between the wage premia andobservable
skills, we construct a “skill index” for each worker. We ﬁrst estimate a
ﬂexible log (hourly) wage equation using our sample.
18 The base explan-
atory variables used in the log wage equation are years of education;
education category dummies (dropout, high school graduates, some col-
lege, and college degree); (actual) experience; experience squared; dummy
variables for race, gender, marital status, and union status; and a set of
dummies for year, industry, and occupation. We include sets of pairwise
interactions between the education category dummies, gender, and race,
as well as interactions between gender and experience, gender and marital
status, and race and experience. We then use the estimated coefﬁcients
from that equation to predict the wage of each worker. The skill index
is the predicted wage based solely on the education and experience of the
worker. That is, although characteristics such as occupation, industry,
union status, and demographic characteristics are included in the initial
wage equation, they are not used to construct the skill index for the
worker. We normalize the skill index to have zero mean.
We have also run an expanded skill-index model including the Armed
Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score as a broad measure of premarket
skills. In this case, the predicted wage for the skill index also uses the
AFQT score. The detailed skill index regression results are reported in
table A1 (in app. A) with and without the AFQT variable included. We
present estimates for our models of occupation and industry wage dif-
ferentials using the skill index without AFQT since thereexistssubstantial
evidence that the skills measured by AFQT are not fully observed by
ﬁrms at labor market entry and represent some of the ability component
learned about by ﬁrms as workers gain labor market experience (Altonji
and Pierret 2001; Lange 2005). The ﬁndings are quite similar for models
using the skill index with and without AFQT.
19
IV. Wages and Returns to Skills across Occupations
We believe that the concepts of sorting and comparative advantage are
likely to play a more important role for occupations than for industries,
17 These industries are stone, clay, and glass; tobacco manufacturing; leather and
leather products; and not speciﬁed manufacturing. Workers in these industries rep-
resent less than 1% of the full sample.
18 The wage variable in all estimated models is the hourly wage on the current
job at the time of the survey.
19 Gibbons et al. (2004) present a full set of estimates using the skill index with
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so we ﬁrst estimate our models for occupations. As we mention in Section
V, other factors such as compensating wage differences and rent-sharing
may mask the importance of comparative advantage in the case of in-
dustries. Furthermore, our one-factor model is well suited to cases where
there is a natural ordering of sectors from least skill sensitive to most skill
sensitive. We believe that this ordering is more likely to apply to occu-
pations (e.g., going from operatives to craft workers to managers) than
to industries.
A. Occupational Wage Premia without Comparative Advantage
Throughout this article, we divide workers into seven conventional
occupation aggregates.
20 In table 1 we report the raw occupation log wage
differentials (relative to the service occupation) and the average values of
measured skills (education and experience) and other measured charac-
teristics (race, sex, and marital status) by occupation. As is well known,
there are large differences across occupations in mean wages and in mean
values for education and other characteristics. There is also a strong link
between these two variables: the correlation between the raw wage pre-
mium and the mean level of education is 0.81 (bottom row of table 1).
The mean skill index for each occupation is reported in column 7 of
table 1. In keeping with the positive correlation between the wage pre-
mium and mean education, we ﬁnd that the correlation between the raw
wage premium and the mean skill index is 0.96. But the cross-occupation
variation in mean log wages in column 1 (SD p 0.181) is almost twice
as large as the cross-occupation variation in the skill index in column 7
(SD p 0.099), suggesting that there may be more to the story than just
observable skills. In this spirit, column 1 of table 2 reports an OLS re-
gression of the log wage on the skill index and six occupation dummies
(operatives and laborers are the base occupation). All the models reported
in table 2 also include controls for industry afﬁliation (nine dummy var-
iables), gender, race, marital status, union status, and a full set of year
dummies.
The skill index is highly signiﬁcant and has a coefﬁcient of one (by
construction), but the occupation coefﬁcients remain highly signiﬁcant,
although smaller than the raw wage differentials reported in table 1. Of
course, such a regression merely replicates the common ﬁnding that the
occupation coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant even after controlling for measured
characteristics. We report it as our point of departure.
In this OLS model, the standard deviation of theestimatedoccupational
wage premia is .092. Column 2 of table2reportsﬁrst-differencedestimates
20 Using a more detailed classiﬁcation does not alter our basic ﬁndings and comes
at the cost of less precise estimates of the occupation effects. Precision is an issue































Professionals .522 15.66 7.38 .534 .136 .583 .1479 .212
Managers .425 14.38 8.31 .432 .137 .562 .1049 .138
Sales occupations .388 14.38 7.49 .400 .118 .550 .0828 .052
Clerical occupations .116 13.17 7.27 .786 .233 .503  .0907 .203
Craft workers .290 12.17 7.96 .077 .157 .499  .0358 .118
Operative and laborers .090 11.92 7.44 .244 .265 .489  .0979 .171
Service occupations .000 12.73 7.10 .532 .310 .424  .0989 .108
Standard deviation (across occupations) .181 1.26 .39 .210 .069 .050 .099
Correlation with raw wage difference 1.00 .81 .53  .12  .94 .93 .96
Note.—This table is based on a sample of 35,438 observations for 5,904 workers. See text for further details.



















Professionals .242* .042* .042* .095* .017 .001
(.007) (.007) (.008) (.016) (.014) (.030)
Managers .238* .022* .049* .052*  .002 .047
(.008) (.007) (.007) (.015) (.013) (.025)
Sales occupations .211* .006 .018 .044*  .014 .053
(.010) (.009) (.010) (.018) (.016) (.031)
Clerical occupations .062*  .003  .019* .010 .006 .049*
(.007) (.006) (.007) (.014) (.013) (.025)
Craft workers .154* .038* .038* .085* .010 .041*
(.008) (.006) (.007) (.013) (.010) (.021)
Service occupations .028*  .020*  .046* .000 .009 .022
(.008) (.007) (.008) (.014) (.014) (.023)
Operatives and laborers .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Skill index 1.000* .676* .866* .630* .690* .663*
(.011) (.050) (.034) (.092) (.043) (.093)
R-squared .381 .043 .740 .069 .031 .061
Observations 35,438 35,438 35,438 9,198 35,438 9,198
Test of equality of occupation effects (p-value) .0000 .0001 .0001 .0001 .4695 .1156
Standard deviation of occupation effects .092 .024 .038 .038 .011 .020
Adjusted standard deviation .092 .023 .037 .035 . . . . . .
Note.—All speciﬁcations also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year effects, industry (nine dummies), and a dummy for collective bargaining coverage. In cols.
5 and 6, the instrumental variables (for changes in occupation) are the full set of interactions between the occupation dummies at time and . The adjusted standard t 1 t 2
deviation is the actual standard deviation of the estimated occupation effects corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates. OLSp ordinary least squares estimation.
FD p ﬁrst-differences estimation. FE p ﬁxed effects estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level.702 Gibbons et al.
of these premia; their standard deviation falls to .024. Of course, these
ﬁrst-differenced estimates might be attenuated by false transitions. One
approach to the false transitions problem is to estimate a ﬁxed effect
regression rather than a ﬁrst-differenced regression.
21 We present ﬁxed-
effect estimates in column 3 of table 2; the occupational wage premia have
a standard deviation of .038. Another approach to the false transitions
problem is to recompute the ﬁrst-differenced estimates on the subsample
of observations in which the worker reports taking a new job (with a
new employer). The resulting wage premia (in col. 4) have a standard
deviation of .038. In sum, the estimates in columns 3 and 4 are consistent
with the view that more than half of the variation in occupational wage
premia (after controlling for measurable skills) may be due to unmeasured
ability bias, even in our simplest model without comparative advantage
or learning.
In Columns 5 and 6 of table 2 we explore the possibility of further
bias associated with learning (but not comparative advantage). As de-
scribed at the end of Section II.B, the problem is that learning about
ability may be correlated with the change in sector afﬁliation (such as
where job loss is exogenous but reemployment is not). As suggested in
Section II.B, we can use wage, skill, and sector information from period
or earlier to instrument for the change in sector afﬁliation between t   1
periods and t. In columns 5 and 6 of table 2 we use as instruments t   1
the full set of interactions between occupation dummies at times t   1
and . For the full sample (col. 5), none of the individual occupation t   2
effects is signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the estimated
occupation effects is quite small (.011), and we cannot reject that these
premia are all zero (p-value p .47). The results for the subsample of new
jobs (col. 6) are relatively similar. Now some of the estimated occupation
effects are individually signiﬁcant, but we still cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that all premia are jointly equal to zero (p-value p .12).
The estimates of the model for the sample of new jobs are much less
precise than when all observations are being used. As we will see in the
next section, limiting the analysis to new jobs appears to be a much more
efﬁcient way of eliminating false transitions in the case of industries than
occupations. The problem is that people can clearly change occupation
by being promoted or reassigned to a different task while staying with
the same employer. We lose these legitimate changes when we focus on
new jobs only. By contrast, it is much more difﬁcult for an employee to
change industry while staying with the same employer. This means we
21 Fixed-effect estimates use information from both ﬁrst differences and longer
differences and so are less affected by measurement error than ﬁrst-difference es-
timates are (Griliches and Hausman 1986).Comparative Advantage 703
should lose little legitimate information by focusing on new jobs in the
case of industries.
22
In sum, our results suggest that accounting for both unmeasured ability
and learning eliminates most of the occupational wage premia. The results
in columns 2–4 of table 2 indicate that controlling for measured and
unmeasured skills explains 80% of the raw standard deviation of wages
across occupations (0.181). The remaining premia are no longersigniﬁcant
when learning is accounted for in columns 5 and 6 of table 2, though
these results are less precise than in the more standard models of columns
1–4.
B. Occupational Wage Premia and Occupational Skill Premia
Our exploration of occupation wage premia without comparative ad-
vantage strongly suggests that learning combined with the sorting of both
measured and unmeasured skills accounts for the bulk of occupational
wage premia. In this section, we explore the sources of this sorting by
adding comparative advantage to the analysis. We indeed ﬁnd important
differences in the returns to measured and unmeasured skills across oc-
cupations. This ﬁnding suggests caution in interpreting the standard oc-
cupational wage premia reported in table 2 (and elsewhere in the litera-
ture). In addition, as we describe below, such occupation-speciﬁc returns
to skill make estimated occupational wage premia difﬁcult to interpret,
even after controlling for differences in returns to skills across sectors.
As a result, we now shift our focus to these differential returns to skill.
In particular, we investigate whether high-skill workers are concentrated
in high-return occupations, as our theory suggests.
Table 3 extends our analysis of occupational wage premia in table 2 by
reporting not only these premia but also occupation-speciﬁc returns to
skills. All models reported in table 3 also include the same set of additional
controls (gender, race, year dummies, etc.) as in table 2. Column 1 of
table 3 reports OLS estimates of the wage premia, while column 2 reports
the occupation-speciﬁc returns to observable skill. Most of the estimated
22 An alternative way of reducing false transitions is to replace the actual industry
at a given point in time with the modal industry over the whole duration of the
job (i.e., over all observations of a given employer-employee match). When this
imputation procedure is used, industry can only change when workers change jobs.
The results obtained using this alternative procedure are very similar to those ob-
tained by simply limiting the sample to new jobs only. Note also that the problem
of false transitions has been reduced since 1994 in the NLSY with the introduction
of a dependent interviewing procedure for industry and occupation (respondents
are ﬁrst asked whether they have changed industry and occupation since the last
interview, while this check was not performed prior to 1994). Given our focus on
learning, however, we would lose most of the period during which learning pre-
sumably matters by limiting our analysis to the post-1993 period.704 Gibbons et al.
Table 3
















Professionals .256* 1.280† .090* 1.231†  .029 .924
(.009) (.040) (.023) (.061) (.041) (.082)
Managers .236* 1.534† .073* 1.217†  .008 .973
(.009) (.042) (.024) (.057) (.045) (.085)
Sales occupations .208* 1.754† .096* 1.250† .054 .998
(.012) (.055) (.029) (.064) (.055) (.239)
Clerical occupations .028* 1.145† .039 1.127†  .071 .836†
(.008) (.041) (.022) (.053) (.039) (.073)
Craft workers .214* 1.284† .032 1.013  .098* .817†
(.009) (.050) (.019) (.047) (.033) (.065)
Service occupations .028* 1.259† .053* 1.158†  .037 .919
(.010) (.048) (.025) (.054) (.048) (.084)
Operatives and laborers .000 1.000 .000 1.000 .000 1.000
Endogenous variables . . . w1 w1, D0, , SK#D0
E#D0
Instrumental variables D0#D1, D1#D2
, SK#D2 E#D2
Number of observations 35,438 35,438 35,438
Test of equality of occupation effects
(p-value) .000 .0016 .0009
Test of equality of interaction slopes
(p-value) .000 .0001 .0002
Standard deviation of occupation effects .105 .027 .053
Adjusted standard deviation .105 .012 .029
Note.—All speciﬁcations also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year effects, industry(nine
dummies), collective bargaining coverage, and (except in cols. 1 and 2) occupation-speciﬁcexperienceeffects.
The speciﬁcation in cols. 3–6 also includes the ﬁrst lag of the occupation dummies interacted with the ﬁrst
lag of experience. In cols. 1 and 2, the interaction terms indicate the effect ofmeasuredskillsintheoccupation
relative to operatives and laborers (effect normalized to one for operatives and laborers). In cols. 3–6, the
interaction terms indicate the effect of both measured and unmeasured skills in the occupation,againrelative
to operatives and laborers, but these occupation-speciﬁc slopes for measured and unmeasured skills are
constrained to be proportional across all occupations. In the endogenous variables,w1 stands for the lagged
wage and D0 stands for contemporaneous values of the occupation dummies . In the {D ; jp1, … ,6} ijt
instrumental variables, D1 and D2 stand for the ﬁrst and second lag of occupation dummies, SK stands for
the skill index, and E stands for experience. The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation
of the estimated occupation effects corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
* Estimated coefﬁcient for this main effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 95% level.
† Estimated coefﬁcient for this interaction is signiﬁcantly different from one at the 95% level.
returns to skill are quite plausible. For example, all occupations have a
signiﬁcantly larger return to skill than operatives and laborers. Managers
and sales occupations have the largest returns to skill, although thereturns
for professionals may be a bit smaller than expected.
In spite of these signiﬁcant differences in occupation-speciﬁc returns
to observable skills (p-value of .00 on the joint test of equality of returns),
the associated occupational wage premia are quite similar to those from
column 1 of table 2 (which did not allow for occupation-speciﬁc returns
to skill). For example, the standard deviation oftheestimatedoccupational
wage premia is .105—just slightly larger than the .092 in column 1 of
table 2. But our analysis in table 2 suggested an important role for un-Comparative Advantage 705
measured skills, so we next investigate occupation-speciﬁc returns to
unobservable skills.
The remaining models reported in columns 3–6 of table 3 allow for
occupation-speciﬁc returns to both measured and unmeasured skill. In
all models, we include (but do not show in the table) a set of interactions
between occupation and experience to capture the term ( in equa-
22 1/2)b j jt
tion (13).
23 We allow returns to measured and unmeasured skill to be
different but proportional. In terms of the parameters of the model, this
means that for all occupations j, where k is a proportionality b p kb jj
parameter.
In the ﬁrst model, reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 3, we analyze
the model with comparative advantage but without learning, so the only
endogenous variable is the lagged wage. In these models we use the full
set of interactions between occupational afﬁliation at time t and as t   1
instrumental variables. Relative to the OLS model of columns 1 and 2,
two features of the results in columns 3 and 4 are striking. First, the
occupational wage premia become much smaller once occupation-speciﬁc
returns to unmeasured skills are accounted for in the estimation. Second,
most of the occupation-speciﬁc returns to skill remain signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from one (the normalized return to skill for operatives and la-
borers). Furthermore, the pattern of returns to skill across occupations
now showsprofessionals,managers,andsalesoccupationswiththehighest
returns.
The joint tests at the bottom of table 3 conﬁrm this pattern of results.
The null hypothesis that the occupational returns to skill are all the same
can be strongly rejected (p-value p .0001). The null hypothesis that the
wage premia are all zero cannot be rejected either, though the p-value is
a little higher than in the case of the returns to skill (p-value p .0016).
As a ﬁnal step, columns 5 and 6 of table 3 report estimates of our richest
theoretical model—equation (13), which allows for both comparative ad-
vantage and learning, so that both the lagged wage and the current oc-
cupation are endogenous. As discussed earlier, we use the full set of in-
teractions between occupational afﬁliation at time and as t   1 t   2
instruments (plus interactions between the skill index and occupational
afﬁliation at time and ). The results reported in columns 5 and t   1 t   2
6 are relatively similar to the corresponding model without learning (cols.
3 and 4) for comparisons of the six occupations, excluding the base oc-
cupation of operatives and laborers. The joint test that all occupational
wage premia are the same can still be strongly rejected (p-value p .0009)
23 Strictlyspeaking,thistermshouldappearinonlythelearningmodel.Weinclude
it in all models with unmeasured skills for the sake of comparability across
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as can the null hypothesis that returns to skill are all the same (p-value
p .0002).
The individual estimates by occupation are a little harder to interpret
because the base group (operative and laborers) has relatively higher re-
turns to skills and a higher occupational wage premium than in the other
models (cols. 2 and 4). As a result, all the estimated returns to skill and
occupation main effects look puzzlingly small relative to the base occu-
pation. Among occupations other than operative and laborers, however,
there is still some heterogeneity in returns to skills. For example, higher
wage occupations such as managers or sales exhibit higher returns to skill
than a lower wage occupation like clerical occupations.
C. Interpretation
The evidence reported in tables 1–3 strongly suggests that comparative
advantage and sorting based on observable and unobservable skills play
important roles in explaining raw occupational wage premia. Table 1
shows strong and systematic sorting of the highly skilled into highly paid
occupations (correlation coefﬁcient p .96). Perhaps not surprisingly,table
2 shows that controlling for measured and unmeasured skills in conven-
tional ways (OLS and ﬁrst differences) successively reduces the standard
deviation of occupational wage premia from 0.181 to 0.092 and to between
0.024 and 0.038 (depending on the estimator used to control for time-
invariant unmeasured skills). The standard deviation of the remaining
occupational wage premia remains at .053 once comparative advantage
and learning are explicitly accounted for by introducing occupation-spe-
ciﬁc returns to measured and unmeasured skills (cols. 5 and 6 of table 3).
The pattern of occupation-speciﬁc returns to skill is strongly consistent
with measured skill sorting across occupations with the exception of the
surprisingly high relative returns to skills for operatives and laborers in
the full model.
The correlation between average measured skills and returns to skill
across our seven occupational categories is 0.74 and 0.34 in the models
without and with learning, respectively.
24 In terms of the main effects,
introducing learning does not change the results substantially (with the
exception of operatives and laborers) once comparative advantage isprop-
erly accounted for in table 3. One possible explanation for this ﬁnding
is that though learning about ability may be quite important in the ﬁrst
few years in the labor market, it may not be as important further into
workers’ careers (Neal 1999). This may explain why learning plays a
limited role in our NLSY sample where we have up to 15 years of labor
market observations per worker.
24 The correlation rises to 0.65 excluding operatives and laborers in the model
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V. Wages and Returns to Skills across Industries
A substantial literature has established that there are large and persistent
wage differentials among industries, even aftercontrollingforawidevariety
of worker and job characteristics (Katz 1986; DickensandKatz1987;Krue-
ger and Summers 1987, 1988). One possibility is that these interindustry
wage differentials largely reﬂect differences in workers’ productive abilities
that are not captured by the variables available in standard individual-level
data sets. An alternative explanation is that measured interindustry wage
differences are “true wage differentials” reﬂecting compensating differen-
tials, noncompetitive rent-sharing, or efﬁciency-wage considerations. Vig-
orous debate has centered on the extent to which industry wage differences
reﬂect competitive factors such as unmeasured ability and compensating
differentials (Murphy and Topel 1987, 1990) as opposed to labor market
rents and on whether such measured wage differentials potentially may
justify certain types of industrial or trade policies (Katz and Summers1989;
Topel 1989).
In this context, our model with comparative advantage and learning
can be viewed as a renewed attempt at “explaining” interindustry wage
differentials by the systematic allocation of unmeasured skills across in-
dustries. For reasons mentioned earlier, we nonetheless expect compar-
ative advantage to play less of a role in explaining sectoralwagedifferences
across industries than across occupations.
A. Industry Wage Premia without Comparative Advantage
We divide workers into 10 conventional industry aggregates.
25 In table
4, we report the raw industry log wage differentials (relative to the retail
trade industry) and the average values of measured skills (education and
experience) and other measured characteristics (race, sex, and maritalstatus)
by industry. Like others, we ﬁnd large differences across industries in mean
wages and in mean values for education and other characteristics. Like
Dickens and Katz (1987), we ﬁnd substantial correlation between theseraw
wage premia and these mean characteristics. For example, the correlation
between the wage premium and the mean level of education is .49. To move
beyond individual skill measures such as education, we use the same skill
index as in the previous section. The mean skill index for each industry is
reported in the ﬁnal column of table 4. The correlation between the wage
premium and the mean skill index is .85. So, at ﬁrst pass, sorting on ob-
servable skill appears to play a slightly smaller role in explaining interin-
dustry wage differences than it did for occupations (when the correlation
coefﬁcient was .96). A related point is that that the cross-industryvariation
25 Using a more detailed classiﬁcation does not substantially alter our basic ﬁnd-
ings and comes at the cost of less precise estimates of the industry effects.Table 4



























Mining and durable manufacturing .359 13.15 7.76 .303 .153 .577 .0106 .142
Nondurable manufacturing .203 13.02 7.40 .405 .170 .529  .0304 .094
Construction .283 11.99 8.06 .085 .166 .486  .0457 .062
Transportation, communication, and utilities .387 13.44 8.09 .333 .253 .529 .0261 .066
Finance, insurance, and real estate .348 14.10 7.43 .659 .172 .505 .0140 .089
Professional and business services .397 14.44 7.52 .471 .173 .525 .0628 .084
Personal services  .032 12.63 7.26 .400 .236 .436  .0685 .041
Wholesale trade .222 14.39 7.34 .659 .219 .545 .0239 .216
Retail trade .000 12.92 7.16 .455 .190 .426  .0654 .145
Public administration .392 14.11 8.06 .484 .307 .593 .0494 .062
Standard deviation (across industries) .151 .78 .34 .160 .047 .051 .045
Correlation with raw wage difference 1.00 .49 .70  .02 .04 .80 .85
Note.—This table is based on a sample of 35,438 observations on 5,904 workers. See the text for further details.
a Mean log wage in the industry relative to retail trade (mean log wage in the retail trade industry is 1.445).Comparative Advantage 709
Table 5



















manufacturing .285* .111* .149* .165* .065* .146*
(.008) (.007) (.008) (.014) (.015) (.023)
Nondurable manufacturing .184* .075* .105* .108* .036* .071*
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.015) (.016) (.024)
Construction .270* .135* .151* .173* .103* .145*
(.010) (.009) (.010) (.017) (.020) (.030)
Transportation, communi-
cations, and utilities .282* .092* .130* .144* .055* .112*
(.009) (.009) (.010) (.017) (.021) (.029)
Finance, insurance, and
real estate .257* .061* .111* .089*  .017 .061*
(.008) (.010) (.010) (.016) (.024) (.027)
Professional and business
services .255* .064* .089* .084*  .004 .049*
(.009) (.008) (.009) (.014) (.015) (.022)
Personal services .006  .012  .001  .001*  .016 .014
(.011) (.009) (.010) (.017) (.017) (.026)
Wholesale trade .090* .054* .067* .078* .035* .066*
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.012) (.014) (.021)
Retail trade .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Public administration .252* .100* .149* .150* .028 .081*
(.011) (.010) (.011) (.022) (.024) (.039)
Skill index 1.000* .811* 1.185* .617* .686* .636*
(.013) (.050) (.046) (.092) (.043) (.092)
R-squared .405 .035 . . . .072 . . . . . .
Number of observations 35,438 35,438 35,438 9,198 35,438 9,198
Test of equality of industry
effects (p-value) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0001
Standard deviation of indus-
try effects .108 .040 .054 .059 .037 .047
Adjusted standard deviation .108 .039 .054 .057 .032 .039
Note.—All speciﬁcations also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year effects, occupation
(six dummies), and collective bargaining coverage. Instrumental variables (for changes in industry afﬁl-
iation) are the full set of interactions between the industry afﬁliation dummies at time and . t 1 t 2
The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the estimated industryeffectscorrected
for the sampling variation in these estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a Estimated coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 95% level.
in mean log wages (.151) is much larger than the cross-industry variation
in the skill index (.045), whereas the cross-occupation variation in the skill
index (0.099) represented more than half the cross-occupation variation in
wages (0.181).
Table 5 reports the estimates of the models without comparative ad-
vantage. All the models reported in table 5 (and table 6) also include
controls for occupational afﬁliation (six dummy variables), gender, race,
marital status, union status, and a full set of year dummies. The results710 Gibbons et al.
without learning reported in columns 1–4 are relatively similar to those
obtained by Krueger and Summers (1988) and others. For instance, OLS
estimates of the interindustry wage differentials in column 1 are large and
signiﬁcant, with a standard deviation of .108. Furthermore, more than
half of the standard deviation of the OLS wage premia across industries
remains when unmeasured skills are controlled for using ﬁxed effects(.054
in col. 3) or ﬁrst differences for new jobs (.059 in col. 4). As discussed
for occupations, the smaller standard deviation of industry wage premia
obtained from ﬁrst differences for all workers (.040) is likely due to false
transitions among workers staying with the same employer.
26
Columns 5 and 6 of table 5 report ﬁrst-differenced IV models, to allow
for the possibility of learning (but not comparative advantage). The in-
strumental variables used in this model are the full set of interactions
between industry afﬁliation at time and . Thestandarddeviation t   1 t   2
of the estimated interindustry wage differentials falls somewhat (from
about .056 in cols. 3 and 4 to about .042 in cols. 5 and 6). Unlike the
case of occupations, however, the null hypothesis of no industry wage
premia is still strongly rejected (p-value p .0001), even in these IV
estimates.
Other interesting patterns emerge from the comparison of results for
industry and occupations. For example, the standard deviation of raw
wages differences is smaller for industries than for occupations (in col. 1
of tables 1 and 4), but the standard deviation of the wage premia across
sectors is at least as large for industries as for occupation in the standard
models without comparative advantage or learning (OLS, ﬁrst-difference,
and ﬁxed-effect estimates in cols. 1–4 of tables 2 and 5). This comparison
suggests that the sorting of measured and unmeasured skills acrosssectors
plays more of a role in explaining the raw wage differentials across oc-
cupations than across industries.
A more subtle point is that controlling for skills has much more impact
for some industries than others. Take the case of two relatively “high-
wage” industries, construction and professional and business services
(PBS). Despite high wages, construction hasrelativelylowmeasuredskills,
while PBS has the highest measured skills of all industries (table 4). The
raw log wage differences indicate that PBS pays 0.114 more than con-
struction. Just controlling for measured skills reverses this pattern. The
26 Our results are also consistent with Krueger and Summers’s (1988) ﬁnding that
ﬁrst-differenced estimates of the industry wage effects can be signiﬁcantly biased
downward because of misclassiﬁcation errors in industry afﬁliation. Standard ﬁrst-
differenced estimates are misspeciﬁed when the whole sample is used but well
speciﬁed for job changers. Since misclassiﬁcation errors in industry changes are
much less likely to occur when a job change is observed than otherwise, we believe
misclassiﬁcation errors are the primary source of misspeciﬁcation in the ﬁrst-dif-
ferenced estimates for the whole sample.Comparative Advantage 711
OLS estimates indicate that construction now pays .015 more than PBS
(col. 1 of table 5). Controlling for unmeasured skills increases the gap in
favor of construction to between 0.062 and 0.089, depending on the es-
timator being used (cols. 3 and 4).
This differential effect of controlling for skills (even without learning
or comparative advantage) suggests that no single theory canlikelyexplain
the wage premia for all industries. In sectors like PBS, the systematic
sorting of skills that follows from our model of comparative advantage
likely accounts for a large share of the premium; in sectors like construc-
tion, compensating wage differences and unionization (rent-sharing) are
more plausible explanations. We next explore this hypothesis formally by
introducing comparative advantage in the estimated models.
B. Industry Wage Premia and Industry Skill Premia
Table 6 extends our analysis by reporting not only the industry wage
premia but also industry-speciﬁc returns to skills. Columns 1 and 2 report
OLS estimates of the wage premia and returns to measurable skills, re-
spectively. As in the case of occupations, there is substantialheterogeneity
in the returns to skill across industries. In spite of this heterogeneity in
industry-speciﬁc returns to skills, controlling for this heterogeneity
slightly increases the standard deviation of the estimated industry wage
premia from .108 (in col. 1 of table 5) to .109. Roughly speaking,industries
with high wage premia tend to exhibit high return to skill, though con-
struction is an important exception.
The standard deviation of industry effects is reduced by about 40% to
.061 when industry-speciﬁc returns to both measured and unmeasured
skills are introduced in columns 3 and 4 of table 6.
27 (The reduction in
the adjusted standard deviation of industry effects—to adjust for impre-
cision in the estimates—is similar when restricting the sample to new jobs
in cols. 5 and 6.) Most of the industry wage premia remain quite large
and signiﬁcant in the models when allowing for industry-speciﬁc returns
to unmeasured skills. This contrasts with our earlier ﬁnding (in table 3)
of a three-quarters reduction in the magnitude of the standard deviation
of occupation effects when allowing occupation-speciﬁc returns to mea-
sured and unmeasured skills. Such results are consistent with our inter-
pretation that comparative advantage plays a more important role in ex-
27 As in thecaseofoccupations,weconstrainreturnstomeasuredandunmeasured
skills to be proportional in all the models with industry-speciﬁc returns to skill.
The instrumental variables are also selected in the same fashion as in the models
foroccupation.Inthemodelswithoutlearning,weuseinteractionsbetweenindustry
afﬁliation at time t and as instruments. In the models with learning, the in- t 1
struments used are the interactions between industry afﬁliation at time and t 1





Estimates of Interindustry Wage Differentials with Comparative Advantage
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Mining and durable manufacturing .285* 1.145† .182* 1.124† .260* 1.109 .176* 1.173† .188* .979
(.008) (.039) (.021) (.042) (.043) (.082) (.039) (.083) (.060) (.121)
Nondurable manufacturing .189* 1.212† .111* 1.098† .163* 1.223† .158* 1.275† .265* 1.625*
(.009) (.044) (.022) (.042) (.053) (.100) (.048) (.100) (.135) (.339)
Construction .254* .861† .180* 1.103 .322* 1.368† .375* 1.804† .327* 1.329
(.011) (.058) (.030) (.066) (.082) (.183) (.114) (.288) (.135) (.302)
Transportation, communications,
and utilities .281* 1.017 .156* 1.208† .219* 1.368† .182* 1.725† .212 1.647
(.009) (.048) (.029) (.062) (.066) (.149) (.080) (.232) (.130) (.339)
Finance, insurance, real estate .246* 1.320† .084* 1.217† .111 1.353† .053 1.263 .007 1.231
(.009) (.043) (.028) (.060) (.058) (.130) (.055) (.136) (.078) (.199)
Professional and business services .241* 1.270† .086* 1.186† .109* 1.168† .093 1.148 .087 1.010
(.009) (.043) (.024) (.050) (.044) (.092) (.091) (.093) (.058) (.102)
Personal services  .020 .626† .010 1.010 .093 1.297 .191* 1.398 .258 1.422
(.012) (.061) (.039) (.092) (.100) (.242) (.098) (.223) (.186) (.401)7
1
3
Wholesale trade .101* .829† .091* 1.135† .079* 1.012 .072* 1.105 .069 .836
(.007) (.036) (.021) (.045) (.035) (.072) (.036) (.084) (.047) (.089)
Retail trade .000 1.000 .000 1.000 .000 1.000 .000 1.000 .000 1.000
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Public administration .258* .922 .147* 1.222† .181* 1.395 .136 1.468†  .082 1.034
(.010) (.049) (.030) (.068) (.079) (.204) (.071) (.211) (.085) (.237)








Number of observations 35,438 35,438 9,198 35,438 9,198
Test of equality of industry effects
(p-value) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0004 .0048
Test of equality of industry slopes
(p-value) .0000 .0154 .0234 .0140 .0078
Standard deviation of industry
effects .109 .061 .090 .098 .129
Adjusted standard deviation .109 .055 .066 .067 .075
Note.—All speciﬁcations also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year effects, occupation (six dummies), collective bargaining coverage, and industry-speciﬁc
experience effects (except in the model of cols. 1–2). The speciﬁcations in cols. 3–10 include interactions of the ﬁrst lag of industry dummies with the ﬁrst lag of experience.
In cols. 1–2, the interaction terms indicate the effect of measured skills in the industry relative to retail trade (normalized to one in retail trade). In cols. 3–10, the interaction
terms indicate the effect of both measured and unmeasured skills in the industry, again relative to retail trade, but these industry-speciﬁc slopes for measured and unmeasured
skills are constrained to be proportional across all industries. In the endogenous variables, w1 stands for the lagged wage and D0 stands for contemporaneous values of the
industry dummies . In the instrumental variables, D1 and D2 stand for the ﬁrst and second lag of industry dummies, SK stands for the skill index, and E {D ,jp1, … ,10} ijt
stands for experience. The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the estimated industry effects corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Estimated coefﬁcient for this main effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 95% level.
† Estimated coefﬁcient for this interaction is signiﬁcantly different from one at the 95% level.714 Gibbons et al.
plaining sectoral wage premia for occupations than for industries. But
this is not to say that comparative advantage plays no role in wage and
afﬁliation decisions across industries. For example, comparing column 3
to column 1 of table 6, the three “high-wage” industries that experience
the largest decrease in estimated wage premia are ﬁnance, insurance, and
real estate (FIRE); professional and business services (PBS); and trans-
portation, communications, and utilities. These three industries also hap-
pen to have the largest estimated returns to skill in column 4 and relatively
high skill levels (table 4).
Broadly speaking, the models reported in the remaining columns of
table 6 are qualitatively similar to the model for all workers without
learning of columns 3–6. In all cases, the joint test of equality of industry
wage premia is strongly rejected. The results for returns to skill are more
mixed. Even though the estimates with learning (cols. 7–10) are less pre-
cisely estimated, there is still signiﬁcant heterogeneity in returns to skill.
C. Interpretation
The existing literature on interindustry wage differentials suggests that
neither a simpleunmeasured abilityexplanation(inwhichabilityisequally
valued in all industries and market perceptions of worker quality are time
invariant) nor a pure rent-based explanation appears fully consistent with
evidence from longitudinal analyses of the wage changes of industry
switchers (Krueger and Summers 1988) or the pre- and postdisplacement
wages of workers displaced by plant closings (Gibbons and Katz 1992).
These ﬁndings have motivated recent work that has focused on econo-
metric approaches for estimating industry wage differentials while ac-
counting for heterogeneous matches between workers (Neal 1995; Kim
1998; Bils and McLaughlin 2001). Our approach is also in this vein.
28
Our results reinforce the view that a single explanation does not ﬁt all
industries. For instance, the industry wage premia in mining, manufac-
turing, and construction remain large and statistically signiﬁcant even in
our richest model with comparative advantage and learning. By contrast,
introducing these two factors essentially eliminates the wage premia in
industries such as FIRE and PBS.
VI. Conclusion
We develop a model of wages and sector choices that generalizes the
static model of sorting with perfect information to the case in which some
skills are unobserved by both the market and the worker. Wage changes
and sector mobility arise endogenously as the market and the incumbent
28 A complementary approach focuses on correlations between ability and in-
vestments in sector-speciﬁc skills (Neal 1998).Comparative Advantage 715
ﬁrm learn about a worker’s skills. We show how this model can be es-
timated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques.
We illustrate our theoretical and econometric approach by studyingboth
occupations and industries. Broadly speaking, the results suggest that the
measured occupational wage differentials in a cross-section regression are
largely due to unmeasured and unobserved worker skills. We ﬁnd evidence
that the sorting of skills into “high-wage” occupations is explained by high
returns to skills in these occupations. Although comparative advantage ap-
pears to play a fundamental role in occupational wage differences, the role
of learning is more limited. One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is
that though learning may be quite important in the ﬁrst few years in the
labor market, it may not be as important later on.
The results forindustriesaremixed,whichisconsistentwiththeexisting
literature. Our richest model with comparative advantage and learning
explainsrelatively wellthecross-sectionalpremiainindustrieslikeﬁnance,
insurance, and real estate and professional and business services. More
traditional explanations like compensating differences and rent-sharing




Log Wage Equations Estimated to Construct the Skill Index
Variables Used to Construct the Skill Index (1) (2)
AFQT .272
(.010)
Years of education .038 .028
(.003) (.003)
Education category:
High school dropout  .126  .046
(.028) (.028)
High school graduate  .140  .095
(.018) (.018)




Experience squared ( 100)  .054  .058
(.018) (.018)
Other control variables:




Nonwhite  .071  .008
(.017) (.017)
Union .168 .176
(.005) (.005)Table A1 (Continued)
Variables Used to Construct the Skill Index (1) (2)
Year dummies: Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes
Interaction terms:
Female # High school dropout  .001  .012
(.018) (.018)
Female # High school graduate .002 .005
(.012) (.012)
Female # Some college .021 .037
(.013) (.013)
Female # Experience  .000  .001
(.001) (.001)
Female # Married  .081  .076
(.008) (.008)
Female # Nonwhite .021 .021
(.010) (.010)
Experience # High school dropout  .015  .014
(.002) (.002)
Experience # High school graduate  .007 ( .007)
(.002) (.001)
Experience # Some college  .001  .001
(.002) (.002)
Nonwhite # High school dropout .087 .050
(.019) (.019)
Nonwhite # High school graduate .001  .006
(.014) (.014)
Nonwhite # Some college  .004  .004
(.015) (.015)





Note.—All models are estimated on a sample of 35,438 observations for 5,904 workers.
The skill index used in tables 1–6 is constructed by computing a predicted wage from col.
1 using only education (both years of education and education categories) and experience
and holding the other variables (female, married, nonwhite, union, year, industry, and oc-
cupation) at their average sample values.Comparative Advantage 717
Appendix B
Choice of Instruments
This appendix explains the choice of the interaction between the sector
afﬁliation at time and as the main set of instruments in the t   1 t   2
model with comparative advantage and learning. The intuition for this
choice is most easily understood using ﬁgure 1. First, note that in the
most general model with comparative advantage and learning, ﬁgure 1
remains as is except that the unmeasured ability hi is replaced by its
expected value conditional on the available information, mi,t 1. Consider
the case of sectors j and in ﬁgure 1. There are four possible “sector j   1
histories” in these two sectors. Workers can either “stay” in sector j  
or j in both time periods or switch (from j to or from to j). 1 j   1 j   1
Workers with expected ability close to the critical value are more v (X) j 1
likely to switch sector than either workers with expected ability clearly
lower than (sector stayers) or clearly higher than v (X) j   1 v (X) j 1 j 1
(sector stayers). In terms of expected ability and wages, “switchers” j   1
currently in sector should earn more than other workers in sector j   1
, while “switchers” currently in sector j should earn less than other j   1
workers in sector j.
Tables B1 (occupations) and B2 (industries) show that the data are
broadly consistent with this prediction. These tables show the average
log wages as a function of current and previous sector afﬁliations. For
example, consider operatives and laborers as sector and craftworkers j   1
as sector j. As expected, “stayers” in the craft occupation earn more (0.08)
than craft workers who switched from operatives and laborers to craft
( 0.09). By contrast, workerswho “switchdown”fromcrafttooperatives
and laborers earn more ( 0.11) than “stayers” in the operative and la-
borers occupation ( 0.17).
This example shows how the interaction between sector afﬁliation at
time t and helps predict wages even after controlling for the current t   1
sector afﬁliation. Similar reasoning can be used to show how the inter-
action between sector afﬁliation at time and can be used to t   1 t   2
predict sector afﬁliation at time t. Recall that like the lagged wage, the
current sector afﬁliation is endogenous in the model with comparative
advantage and learning.
Consider, for example, the choice of sector at time t of individuals
observed to be in sector j at time . Remember from ﬁgure 1 that the t   1
expected ability of sector j workers (at time ) who were in sector t   1
at time should be lower (close to ) than the expected j   1 t   2 v (X) j 1
ability of sector j workers who were also in sector j at time . Consider t   2
a positive productivity signal that increases expected ability mi. Since
sector j stayers (at time and ) are closer to the upper critical t   1 t   2
value than the switchers who just came from sector , the stayers v (X) j   1 j
are more likely to move to sector at time t than the switchers. This j   1
shows how the interaction between sector afﬁliation at time and t   1




Average Value of Log Wage in Year t (Relative to the Mean) as a Function of Occupations in Years t and t 1
Occupation Categories












Professionals .30 .36 .26 .07 .18 .02  .05 .26
Managers .36 .21 .26 .01 .12  .16  .22 .16
Sales occupations .23 .22 .24  .09  .20  .35  .45 .13
Clerical occupations .05  .05  .14  .15  .10  .27  .41  .15
Craft workers .15 .13  .12  .12 .08  .09  .21 .03
Operatives and laborers .01  .22  .25  .25  .11  .17  .39  .17
Service occupations  .06  .26  .51  .45  .27  .39  .24  .26




Average Value of Log Wage (Relative to the Mean) in Year t as a Function of Industry in Year t and t 1
Industry Categories
First Lag of Industry Categories
Mining

















Mining and durables .15 .03  .05 .15 .09 .24  .10 .05  .21 .24 .11
Nondurables .01  .03  .22  .08 .03 .02  .22  .08  .18  .05  .05
Construction  .05  .12 .09 .06  .01  .04  .15  .11  .18  .13 .03
Transportation and utilities .17 .08  .04 .20 .17 .10  .18  .09  .19 .10 .14
Finance, insurance, and real estate .02  .12 .00  .08 .13 .16  .33  .08  .22 .05 .10
Business and professional services .21 .02  .11 .03 .16 .25  .18 .01  .22 .02 .15
Personal services  .18  .41  .16  .17  .40  .26  .26  .34  .38  .01  .28
Wholesale trade .05  .12  .19  .04  .11  .04  .30  .00  .22 .01  .03
Retail trade  .29  .31  .39  .23  .33  .24  .31  .29  .23  .25  .25
Public administration  .01 .05  .07 .07 .00 .16  .05  .01  .08 .19 .14
All .10  .05 .02 .14 .10 .16  .25  .02  .23 .15  .00720 Gibbons et al.
Table B3






Occupations 16.27 16.27–38.69 60
Industries 11.46 17.45–26.68 117
Note.—As mentioned in the text and the tables, in the case with comparative advantage butnolearning
we use the sector afﬁliations at time t and (instead of and ) as instruments. In this case, t 1 t 1 t 2
the F-statistics are 10.70 and 8.27 for occupations and industries, respectively, which largely exceed the
critical values.
In summary, sector histories (interaction between sector dummies at
time and ) should help predict both the wage at and the t   1 t   2 t   1
sector afﬁliation at time t in the model with comparative advantage and
learning. Tables B1 and B2 suggest that they do so in the case of the wage.
A more formal test consists of testing the predictive power of the sector
histories on the lagged wage and current afﬁliation after controlling for
all other exogenous variables of the model. In a linear model, this test is
just the standard F-test of the predictive power of the excluded instru-
ments in the ﬁrst-stage equation. Testing for the predictive power of
instruments is more complicated in a nonlinear context. In the linear
model , the “ﬁrst stage” consists of projecting all the right- y p xb   e
hand-side variables (x) on the set of instruments, where the x variables
also happen to be (minus) the derivative (or gradient) of e with respect
to the parameters b (since ). In the nonlinear model, the equiv- e p y   xb
alent of the ﬁrst stage is thus a regression of the gradient of e with respect
to the structural parameters. Those derivatives will typically be nonlinear
combinations of various x variables. One way to measure the predictive
power of the instruments is thus to compute F-tests on the excluded
instruments in these “gradient” regressions.
The more intuitive approach we follow is to linearize the gradients as
a function of the various explanatory variables. Once this linearization is
performed, we can simply compute the usual F-test on the “ﬁrst-stage”
equations for the lagged wage and the current sector afﬁliation. To be
consistent with the estimated models of table 3 and table 6, our excluded
instruments are the interactions between sector afﬁliation at time t   1
and as well as interactions of sector afﬁliation at time with t   2 t   2
the skill index and experience. The F-statistics are reported in table B3.
In all cases, they largely exceed the critical values (at the 95% conﬁdent
level) of 1.26 for industries and 1.39 for occupations.
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